November 4, 2024
Because of their unique structure as blank check companies, and their use as financing vehicles to take private companies public (referred to as a “de-SPAC” transaction), many unsuccessful SPAC mergers have since been challenged by stockholders in various types of securities litigation.
SPAC related securities cases generally have taken two forms—each designed to compensate different groups of investors. On one hand, many cases are brought as securities fraud class actions on behalf of open-market purchasers in the post-merger company after disclosure of negative financial news. These cases follow the typical pattern for securities fraud cases. On the other hand, the Delaware courts have found that in many of these ultimately unsuccessful transactions, SPAC insiders and controllers acted disloyally by recommending an unfair transaction to the pre-merger SPAC stockholders while obtaining out[1]sized financial benefits for themselves. These claims have been referred to as MultiPlan claims after the first case decided under Delaware law.
Recently, Cohen Milstein reached a settlement of MultiPlan-type claims in a SPAC related matter involving the merger of Pivotal Investment Corporation II (“Pivotal II”) and XL Fleet Corp. (“XL Fleet”) now known as Spruce Power. This case and the related settlement highlight the unique and complex nature of these actions and some of the difficulties presented when litigating and settling SPAC cases. See In re XL Fleet (Pivotal) Stockholder Litigation, Consol. C.A. No. 2021-0808-KSJM.
Prior to its merger with Pivotal II, XL Fleet was a privately held company manufacturing electrical vehicles. Like other typical SPAC transactions, XL Fleet became a publicly traded company through a de-SPAC merger with Pivotal II (“Merger”). At the time of the Merger, December 21, 2020, Pivotal II’s stock was priced at $10.00 per share based on a purported valuation of $1 billion. Pivotal II stockholders voted to approve the Merger pursuant to an allegedly materially misleading merger proxy (“Proxy”). Like all other de-SPAC merger transactions, Pivotal II stockholders had the option before the Merger occurred to redeem their Pivotal II shares for $10.00 per share plus interest.
Immediately following the Merger, XL Fleet’s stock began trading well-above $10.00 per share and continued to trade above that price for the next several months. On March 3, 2021, Muddy Waters released a short-sellers report which revealed a number of alleged serious problems in the company’s business and its inflated valuation. Following release of the Muddy Waters’ report, XL Fleet’s stock price dropped below $10.00 and continued to steadily decline over the next year.
Not unexpectedly, shareholders filed each of the two types of securities litigation: federal securities class actions on behalf of open-market purchasers of XL Fleet stock and state breach of fiduciary duty cases challenging the Merger disclosures. Since XL Fleet was incorporated in Delaware, Cohen Milstein undertook a books and records investigation under Delaware law on behalf of a stockholder to investigate the circumstances surrounding the Merger. Following that investigation, the firm filed a complaint in Delaware Chancery Court alleging that the Merger Proxy issued by Pivotal II was materially false and misleading which was a breach of Defendants’ fiduciary duties. The allegations of misrepresentations focused on three areas: (i) the failure to disclose the actual net cash per share available to contribute to the Merger; (ii) Defendants’ failure to conduct due diligence of XL Fleet in connection with the Merger; and (iii) the failure to disclose XL Fleet’s true valuation and the numerous problems affecting its business and operations.
The primary claim under Delaware law related to the Proxy’s alleged misrepresentation that the amount of cash available for the Merger was $10.00 per share when, in fact, the net cash per share available after calculating the dilution and certain expenses left only $7.66 per share available for the Merger. In short, stockholders did not get full value for their shares contributed to the Merger. Claims relating to the failure to properly disclose net cash per share have been upheld in other de-SPAC transaction cases. The Delaware Chancery Court eventually upheld this and the other misrepresentation claims alleged in the complaint.
Unique to the Pivotal II transaction was a separate breach of contract claim based on the Pivotal II’s charter. The charter required Pivotal II to enter into a business combination with a target company (XL Fleet) having a value of no less than 80% of the assets or value of Pivotal II. The required minimum in this case was approximately $180 million. Plaintiffs alleged that the pre-Merger value of XL Fleet, did not meet or exceed Pivotal II’s mandated minimum valuation. Evidence suggested that certain valuations of XL Fleet were well below the minimum value required which would be a breach of Pivotal II’s charter and give rise to a breach of contract claim. That claim was also sustained by the Court.
Following the completion of discovery, the parties reached an agreement to settle the Delaware action for $4.75 million. By that time, the federal securities class action on behalf of open-market purchasers of XL common stock had settled for $19.5 million. Although there may be some overlap between the two cases, the settlements are designed to compensate two separate groups of stockholders for different types of unlawful conduct.
The Delaware action settlement will compensate pre-merger investors in Pivotal II who were misled into voting to approve the Merger due to the issuance of a misleading Proxy. Unlike the class of investors who were harmed by the misleading statements made in connection with open market purchases of XL Fleet stock, stockholders in this case were injured because their decision on whether or not to redeem their shares was impaired by the false and misleading Proxy. Because Pivotal II stockholders did not receive adequate value for the assets contributed to the Merger they were injured. This was a harm unique to this group of stockholders.
In litigation involving de-SPAC transactions the parallel nature of Delaware fiduciary litigation and federal securities class actions work in tandem to ensure that different groups of interested stockholders receive compensation for different types of claims. In fact, Delaware courts have come to recognize the separate type of damages investors may suffer when their right to redeem is impaired by a misleading proxy. As Delaware law continues to evolve in the context of de-SPAC mergers, it remains to be seen how the courts will address damages to the pre-merger SPAC stockholders.